This paper examines how ownership structure and institutional development influence the liquidity management and investment policies of firms, in response to the threat of political extraction in China. First, we document evidence that firms controlled by private entrepreneurs hold less cash reserves than their state-owned counterparts. In addition, cash holdings (investments) is positively (negatively) related to the strength of economic institutions. The results are consistent with the hypothesis that managers of private firms and firms located in provinces with weaker institutions have incentives to protect their assets from being expropriated by politicians, through holding less cash (which are easier to extract) and pursuing more investments in fixed assets (which are harder to extract). Finally, we find that firms with close connections to politicians hoard cash reserves and display lower investments than their nonconnected counterparts. This suggests that political connections mitigate the threat of political extraction for those connected firms.
Introduction
Despite the rapid growth and development of China's economy in the past two decades, economic and legal institutions in China are still far from ideal (Allen et al., 2005; Yao and Yueh, 2009 ). The weak enforcement of property rights has given rise to rampant rent-seeking activities by government bureaucrats, as highlighted by numerous anecdotal evidences and academic studies in recent years (e.g., Fan et al., 2007) . In particular, firms owned by private entrepreneurs are more likely to be the subject of political extraction than state-owned enterprises. For example, an article in Investor Daily finds that the actual income tax rate for private firms is almost twice that for state firms in 2009. 1 This problem is exacerbated by the variation in economic and legal institutions across different provinces in China. In spite of this, very little is known regarding managerial incentives to protect their assets from the threat of political extraction by government officials in China. This motivates us to systematically examine the implication of political extraction on firms' corporate policies.
In a recent cross-country study, Caprio et al. (2009) argue that managers have incentives to protect their assets from being expropriated by government bureaucrats, especially in countries where the threat of political extraction is high. This is achieved through restructuring their assets from liquid assets (such as cash and cash equivalents, which are easier to extract) to illiquid assets (such as fixed assets, which are harder to extract).
In this paper, our objectives are two-fold. First, we investigate whether ownership structure and institutional development influence the liquidity management and investment policies of firms, in response to the threat of political extraction in China. Our findings reveal that firms controlled by private entrepreneurs tend to hold less cash reserves than their state-owned counterparts. Meanwhile, firms in provinces with weak institutions also tend to hold less cash and exhibit more investments in fixed assets than those located in provinces with strong institutions.
Several recent studies (e.g., Li et al., 2008; and Chen et al., 2010a) have argued that establishing connections to politicians or government bureaucrats is imperative for Chinese firms as it provides an alternative mechanism to shelter themselves from the threat of political extraction. Quoting from an article published in the New York Times: "Politicians vet land sales and set zoning rules. They decide who gets bank loans and who can list shares on China's stock markets. Tax rates are usually subject to negotiation. Businessmen need political connection to thrive."
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With this in mind, our second objective is to examine the role of political connections in mitigating the threat of political extraction for both private and state-owned firms in China. We find evidence that connected firms are more likely to hoard cash reserves and e lower investments in fixed assets than their non-connected counterparts.
Overall, the findings in our paper should provide important insights to both investors and policy makers. We contribute to the literature on how political forces impact firm behavior and policies. Our single-country setting has several advantages over Caprio et al. (2009). First, this setting is relatively free from the omitted variables problem often encountered in cross-country studies. Second, we demonstrate that ownership structure and political connections, in addition to economic and legal institutions impact firm policies, which is not examined in Caprio et al. (2009) . To the extent that China's political, economic, and legal institutions are similar to many other transitional economies, the findings from our paper have implications to those markets as well.
Moreover, our study contributes to the growing literature on political connections (Fisman, 2001; Faccio, 2006) by showing that political connections increase firm's ability to resist political extraction. In particular, our study offers fresh evidences on how political connections influence firms' corporate decisions (liquidity management and investments policies).
Finally, our study complements the literature on fiscal decentralization in China (Jin et al., 2005; Zhang, 2006) . We provide evidence that under fiscal decentralization, private firms and firms in provinces with weaker institutions are forced to adopt corporate policies that deviate from the optimum. To the extent that this represents an unintended consequence of fiscal decentralization, our work has important implications to policy makers.
The remainder of the papers is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the related literatures and develops the main hypotheses. Section 3 describes the source of data and the definitions of the variables. Section 4 provides the empirical analysis and discussions of our main results.
Finally, Section 5 concludes the paper.
Literature Review and Hypothesis Development
Our study is related to several strands of literature in economics and finance: fiscal decentralization, corporate liquidity and investment policies, and the role of political connections.
We review the relevant studies and develop our hypotheses as follows.
Fiscal Decentralization and Political Extraction in China
To align local government incentives with promoting markets and productive enterprises, Chinese government has decentralized its fiscal system by linking the fiscal expenditure of local governments closely to their local fiscal revenues. In China, under the tax-sharing system with effect from 1994, taxes and fees are widely regarded as an important source of revenue for local provincial governments (Jin et al., 2005 revenue is typically shared between the local government and the enforcing government bureaus.
As such, the implicit tax rates and fee burdens are likely to vary across regions with differing degrees of market development and government intervention (Zhang, 2006) . In provinces with stronger (more developed) institutions, the reliance on the extra-budgetary revenue is significantly reduced, and thus the government's incentive to harass business entities for extra charges is relatively weak. Furthermore, government officials in those regions are more constrained in their action to extract benefits from firms because of the strong legal enforcement and outside monitoring. Finally, because governments in those regions are less likely to intervene in firm operation, their ability to extract benefits is also considerably weakened.
Evidences from extant studies also indicate that there exists regulatory discrimination between state-owned and entrepreneur-controlled firms, to the extent that the private sector is often the subject of state-predation. For example: Brandt and Li (2003) and Allen et al. (2005) document that ownership structure does matter as private enterprises are often disadvantaged in terms obtaining bank loans. In a survey of five former socialist countries, Johnson et al. (2000) further find that tax rates for private firms are higher in countries (such as Russia and Ukraine where bribes and "unofficial hidden" activity are more prevalent.
From these studies, we argue that private enterprises and those firms located in provinces with weak institutions are often disadvantaged in terms of tax and fees treatments, and are more likely to face higher threat of political extraction by the government bureaus as compared to their state-owned counterparts and those firms located in provinces with strong institutions.
The Implications of Political Extraction on Corporate Policies in China
Opler et al. (1999) examine the determinants of corporate cash holdings for the U.S. firms.
They document that firms' cash holdings increase with investment opportunities, firm size, and cash flows. Since then, several recent papers have documented that corporate governance at both country and firm levels could potentially influence corporate cash holdings in both U.S. and international firms. Myers and Rajan (1998) and Stulz (2005) propose that liquid assets (such as cash and cash equivalents) are more susceptible to the threat of political extraction and that managers have incentives to shelter their assets mitigate the threat. A recent paper by Caprio et al. (2009) empirically examines these propositions in an international setting. Using country-level corruption indices to measure the threat of political extraction, they find that firms in countries where corruption level is high are more likely to hold less cash and increase their investments in fixed assets (regardless of whether the projects yield positive NPV). These actions, which are taken in response to the threat of political extraction may explain why corruption is "evil" and may impede economic development in some countries.
Our first hypothesis, H1, deals with the implications of political extraction on firm's liquidity management and investments policies. Earlier, we have mentioned that private firms and firms in provinces with weaker (less developed) institutions suffer from higher threats of political extraction. We posit that, to prevent resources (especially cash) from being extracted out by government bureaucrats, managers of these firms should have more incentives to shift their assets structure from liquid assets to non-liquid assets. This leads to these firms holding lower cash balances than their counterparts (state-owned enterprises and firms located in provinces with stronger institutions). Therefore, the first part of our first hypothesis, H1A, is stated as follows:
H1A: Private firms and firms located in provinces with weaker institutions hold less cash than state-owned enterprises and firms located in provinces with stronger institutions.
One natural prediction following H1A is that managers of firms which suffer from a higher threat of political extraction (private firms and firms located in provinces with weak institutions) will utilize the cash by increasing the investments in fixed assets such as equipment and buildings, which are harder to be extracted by politicians. Connections will also influence firms' financing and firm performance (Li et al., 2008; Fan et al., 2008a) , diversification pattern (Fan et al., 2008b) , incentives to engage in related party transactions (Cheung et al., 2010) , investment efficiency (Chen et al., 2010b) , cross-listing decisions (Hung et al., 2008) , and the effectiveness of regulatory changes to improve minorityshareholder protection (Berkman et al., 2010) .
In our second hypothesis, H2, we conjecture that political connections help to mitigate the threat of political extraction. In this respect, we predict that politically connected firms have greater abilities to protect their assets from being extracted. Therefore, they are more likely to hoard cash reserves, and exhibit lower investments than their non-connected counterparts.
Therefore, H2, is stated as follows:
H2: Politically connected firms hold more cash, and invest less than non-connected firms.
Source of Data and Variables Description
Our data comprises of provincial-level institutional indices and firm-level corporate governance as well as financial attributes. We collect firm-level financial data and the ultimate Provinces with higher values on the institutional variables are implied to be more developed in terms of market development and are more protected from expropriation of property rights.
Therefore, firms located in these provinces will face a lower risk of political extraction by government bureaucrats. Panel A of Table 1 presents the descriptive statistics of these institutional variables, by provinces.
[Insert Table 1 We construct several dummy variables to represent firm-level corporate governance attributes: (1) Private to represent firms whose ultimate controlling shareholders are private entrepreneurs; (2) Conn_Pri to represent private firms with executives who are/were serving as government officials; (3) Conn_SOE to represent those state-owned firms whose ultimate controlling shareholders are the central government. 8 We predict that politically connected entrepreneur firms (central-state firms) should have greater abilities to resist political extraction than their counterparts (local-state firms). In addition, we also collect the ownership variable, Largest, which is calculated as the percentage of ownership by the largest shareholder.
For the financial variables, we compute a firm's cash holdings ratio (Cash) as cash and cash equivalents divided by total assets at the end of year t. Invest is investment ratio and is calculated as net capital expenditures divided by total sales at the end of year t. Lev is leverage ratio and is calculated as total debts divided by total assets at the end of year t. Capx is investments in fixed assets ratio, and is calculated as capital expenditures divided by total assets at the end of year t. Q is Tobin's Q, our measure of investment opportunity and is calculated as the market value of equity plus book value of liabilities divided by book value of common equity. CF is cash flow ratio and is calculated as the cash flows from operations divided by total assets at the end of year t. Delta_NWC is the change in net working capital ratio, calculated as the change in current assets minus current liabilities from year t-1 to year t divided by total assets at the end of year t.
Size is the natural logarithm of the book value of total assets in millions of Yuan at the end of year t and is taken as a proxy for firm size.
We require our sample to have non-missing firm-year observations and exclude firms operating in the financial industry. We also exclude firms with certain firm-level financial ratios (cash holdings and leverage) that are negative or above 1 to minimize the data error problem.
Finally, we winsorize all our control variables at the 1 st and 99 th percent levels to make sure that our results are not attributed to outliers in the data. Table 1 outlines the sample selection process.
[Insert Table 1 here]
Overall, our pooled sample consists of 9,743 firm-year observation ( As for the other control variables, the mean (standard deviation) of CF are about 5 (8) percent; the mean (standard deviation) of Q is 2.4 (1.5); the mean (standard deviation) of LEV is 48 (18) percent; the mean (standard deviation) of Delta_NWC is -2 (9) percent; the mean (standard deviation) of Capx is 8 (9) percent; and the mean (standard deviation) of Size is 7.4 (1) respectively.
[Insert Table 2 here]
The correlations between the provincial-level institutional indices and our two main firmlevel financial variables of interest (Cash and Invest) are presented in Table 2 . We observe that the Cash is negatively correlated to Invest and positively correlated to all four measures for the strength of institutions. On the other hand, Invest is negatively correlated to all proxies for institutional development. The correlation coefficients are mostly significant and range from -0.22 to -0.41. Meanwhile, the correlations among the four provincial-level indices are high and significant at least at the 5 percent level, with magnitudes ranging from 0.36 to 0.84.
[Insert Table 3 here]
Empirical Results and Discussions

The Implication of Political Extraction on Corporate Policies
Our first empirical task is to examine the role of ownership structure and institutional development on firms' liquidity management and investment policies, in response to the threat of political extraction in China. We estimate equation (1) We estimate equation (1) Table 4 , we document evidences that private firms are more likely to decrease their cash holdings in response to the threat of political extraction.
One possible reason is that cash and cash equivalents is the most vulnerable asset (Myers and Rajan, 1998) and as a result, private firms in China will structure their assets in such a way so as to prevent assets from being extracted by government bureaucrats. On average, private enterprises will hold 1.5 percent to 2.8 percent less cash as a percentage of total assets, as compared to state-owned firms. Likewise, the economic significance of the result is quite substantial. Holding other variables constant, a one standard deviation increase in the Decentr index will result in a 0.52 (for stateowned firms) and 1.42 percent (for private firms) increase in firms' cash holdings.
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Moreover, we also find that the coefficient of the interaction term between Private and Institution, 3 b , is positive and statistically significant at the 5 percent levels in all the four specifications. This implies that the inverse relationship between cash holdings and the private firm dummy variable is more pronounced for those provinces with weaker institutions.
As for the other control variables, most are significantly correlated to cash holdings in the expected manner. In particular, firms with lower leverage and change in net working capital; and those with larger cash flow and investment opportunities are found to hold more cash.
Interestingly, we find that cash holdings is positively and significantly related to firm size (with p-values below 0.01 in all specifications), which is inconsistent with the finding in the existing literature by Opler et al. (1999) and Dittmar et al. (2003) .
[Insert Table 4 here]
Since we argue that private firms and firms located in provinces with weaker institutions hold less cash in response to the threat of political extraction, the next task is to empirically investigate whether firms will convert the cash into fixed assets which are more difficult to extract. We test this proposition by estimating equation (2) 
where the dependent variables are the net investments spending (adjusted by dividends) by firm i in year t respectively. All other variables are as defined earlier.
As argued in the section on hypothesis development, we do not have any apriori prediction on the sign of the coefficient of 1 b . However, H1B still predicts that the coefficient of 2 b should be negative in the investment regressions. The results in displayed in Table 5 . As predicted, our results for the provincial-level institutional indices are similar to that in Caprio et al. (2009) , in that there exists a positive relationship between the likelihood of political extraction and firms' net investments spending. In other words, as firms located in provinces with stronger institutions face less threat of being politically extracted, they have less incentives to structure their assets from liquid assets (cash) to less-liquid assets (investments), leading to these firms holding more cash and thus spending less on investments.
Although we do not find any significant association between the private firm dummy variable (Private) and net investments spending, the coefficient of the interaction term between
Private and Institution exhibits positive sign and is statistically significant at least at the five percent level in three out of the four specifications. In terms of economic significance, holding other variables constant, a one standard deviation increase in the Decentr index leads to a 0.7 (private firms) to 2.1 percent (state-owned firms) decrease in firms' net investments spending.
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The interpretation of the result is as follows: on one hand, we should expect private firms to divert their resources from cash to spending more in terms of investments as a means to protect their assets from being extracted. On the other hand, state-owned enterprises will tend to invest more than the former from the perspective of the soft-budget constraint. Therefore, the current results we have are insufficient to draw inference about the impact of ownership structure on investments.
[Insert Table 5 here]
In sum, our results so far have documented evidence that ownership structure and institutional development influence firms' liquidity management and investments policies, in response to the threat of political extraction in China. Specifically, private firms, especially those located in provinces with weak institutions, are subject to a greater likelihood of political extraction. One possible way these firms can get around this problem is to structure their assets by reducing their cash holdings (which are most vulnerable to extraction) and in turn utilize the cash by increasing their investments in fixed assets (which are harder to extract).
The Role of Political Connections
In this sub-section, we investigate the role of political connections on the implications of political extraction in China. Based on previous studies, we posit that politically connected private firms (central state firms) may have greater abilities to resist political extraction than nonconnected firms (local state firms, and therefore may hold more cash and invest less than the latter.
Our first prediction of H2 is with regards to the effect of political connections on firms' cash holdings in China. We estimate equations (3) and (4) Table 6 . Although the coefficient 1 b is found to be mostly positive, with magnitudes ranging from 0.018 to 0.059, it is only statistically significant at the five percent level in the specification with Mkt2 as the institutional index. More importantly, the interaction coefficient between Conn_Pri and Institution is negative and statistically significant at least at the ten percent level in three out of four specifications. In other words, politically connected private firms can afford to hold more cash as the established connections mitigate the threat of political extraction and this relationship is found to be more pertinent for firms located in provinces with weaker institutions.
For the state-owned enterprises, we observe from the results in Panel B of Table 6 that the coefficient 1 b is positive and significant at least at the ten percent level in two out of four specifications, suggesting that central-state firms tend to hold more cash than local-state firms.
None of the interaction coefficient between Conn_SOE and Institution is significant at the conventional level of significance. All other control variables in Table 6 exhibit similar association with cash holdings as in Table 4 .
[Insert Table 6 here]
Our second prediction of H2 entails the role of political connections on firms' net investments spending in China. We estimate equations (5) and (6) The prediction from H2 is that the coefficient 1 b should be negative in the investments regressions. The results from Panel A Table 7 validate our prediction as the politically connected dummy variable is negatively correlated to net investments spending in all four specifications, and it is statistically significant at least at the ten percent level in two specifications. In terms of economic significance, private firms with political connections spend 4 to 11 percent less in terms of investments out of total sales, as compared to their non-connected peers.
Moreover, we find that the interaction coefficient between Conn_Pri and Institution is positive in all specifications and it is statistically significant at the one percent level in the specification with Legal as the institutional index. The results indicate that the negative relationship between political connection and investment is more significant for private firms in provinces with weak institutions.
The results for the state-owned firms, as presented in Panel B of Table 7 , are in general stronger than that for the private firms. We find that state-owned firms connected to the central government, on average, spend less on investments as compared to their non-connected counterparts. The interaction coefficient between Conn_SOE and Institution is now positive and significant at the five percent level in two out of four specifications, suggesting that the difference in investment levels between central and local-state firms shrinks with the development of institutions. Likewise, the signs and magnitudes of the coefficients of the other control variables in Table 7 are consistent with that found in Table 5 .
To summarize, we find evidence that political connections mitigate the problem of political extraction. We have illustrated that politically connected firms have more incentives to hoard cash reserves and pursue less investments.
[Insert Table 7 here]
Robustness Tests
In this sub-section, we perform several robustness tests to ensure that our results are not sensitive to any measurement errors, changes in specifications, or endogeneity among the variables.
Measures of Political Extraction
In the analysis we have conducted so far, we argue that private enterprises and firms located in provinces with weak institutions indeed suffer from higher threats of political extraction. We test whether this is indeed the case by using the total amount of taxes and fees (adjusted by subsidy from the government) paid by the firms as a measure the extent of political extraction. where the dependent variable is the taxes and fees ratio (Tax_Fees) of firm i in year t. We also control for other firm-specific determinants of effective tax rates paid by firms as documented by Zimmerman (1983) , Watts and Zimmerman (1986), and Gupta and Newberry (1997) .
Using Mkt2 as the institutional development index, we document that the private firm dummy variable exhibits positive (magnitude = 0.024) and significance association (with t-stats = 2.55) with total taxes and fees ratio. 13 In addition, the coefficient on Mkt2 is negative (magnitude of -0.043) and highly significant (with t-stats = -8.46). We further interact both 12 We use this measure as they constitute an important source of revenue for the local provincial governments, and they are an important form of political extraction as indicated by Capiro et al. (2009) . Tax_Fees has a mean of 7 percent and a standard deviation of 6 percent. The true amount that is extracted from the firm by politicians may be larger than the reported taxes and fees, as it may include bribes (which are unreported in the accounts). 13 The results are qualitatively and quantitatively similar if we replace Decentr with the other measure of economic institutions.
Private and Mkt2 and we find that the coefficient of the interaction term, 3 b , is negative and weakly significant at the 10 percent level.
In terms of the other control variables, we document that large firms will pay significantly higher taxes and fees. This finding supports the political-cost theory proposed by Zimmerman (1983) and Watts and Zimmerman (1986) . Leverage is negatively related to the tax ratios since higher leverage will increase the interest expenses, which is tax-deductible. Moreover, firms with larger cash flow, investment opportunities, investments in fixed assets and those whose largest shareholder owned a greater proportion of shares also pay more taxes and fees. Thus, our findings validate the numerous anecdotal evidences that private enterprises and those firms located in provinces with weak (less developed) institutions indeed suffer from a higher threat of political extraction as these firms will need to pay higher taxes and discretionary fees to the governments.
Alternative Specifications
Our findings are based on regressions using firm-year observations. We also perform regressions using aggregated data across all years for each of the province, using Fama-MacBeth (1979) methodology, dividing our sample into two sub-periods (1999-2003 and 2004-2007) , an alternative measure of cash holdings (computed as cash and cash equivalents divided by total sales), including a dummy variable for firms that pay dividends, and including lagged vales of the dependent variables (Cash and Invest) in the specifications. 14 The main results that we obtain previously remain unchanged regardless of the changes in specifications.
14 The results are available upon request from the authors.
Endogeneity Issues
We acknowledge that our results may be driven by the endogenous relationships between the dependent and independent variables. For example: the low liquidity that we find in private firms could be a consequence of extraction (since these firms have to pay higher taxes and fees), rather than a strategy to avoid extraction by lowering cash holdings.
As mentioned by Caprio et al. (2009) , if the low cash holdings are consequences of higher taxes and fees, ex-ante, we should observe that private firms and firms located in provinces with weaker institutions to reserve more cash to cater for their normal operations as well as for the payoffs to politicians if the amount and timing of such expenses are highly uncertain, which imply that we should expect to see a positive (negative) relationship between cash holdings and the private firm dummy variable (institutional index). Ex-post, after the payoffs have been made, we should not expect to see any relationships between cash holdings with the private firm dummy variable or the institutional index. However, these predictions are contrary to the negative relationship between cash holdings and the threat of political extraction that we have established in our findings.
Finally, in testing the role of political connection in mitigating the effects of political extraction, we assume that the connection variables to be exogenous. Ex-ante, firms that are more likely to suffer from extraction will have stronger incentives to build connections with politicians. In this respect, we use a two-stage least-squares approach (2SLS): in the first-stage regression, we use the private firm dummy variable and the institutional index as instruments in the firms' decision to build political connection. We further control for other variables which prior studies find to be important determinants of political connection. In the second-stage regression, we use the explained value of connection as an independent variable in the cash holdings and investment regressions. Again, the main results remain unchanged after controlling for the endogeneity of the measure of political connection.
Conclusions
Buiding on the analysis by Caprio et al. (2009) on the incentives of firms to structure their assets to protect valuable and vulnerable resources from being extracted by government bureaucrats, we examine how ownership structure, institutional development and political connections influence corporate decisions for listed firms, in response to the threat of political extraction in China. One important finding from our paper is that in addition to provincial-level institutional factors, firms' ownership characteristics (whether these firms are state-owned or private enterprises) also matter in firms' liquidity management and investments policies.
Specifically, as private enterprises and firms located in provinces with weak (less developed)
institutions typically face higher risk of political extraction, managers of these firms have incentives to protect their assets from the being extracted through holding less cash (which are easier to extract) and pursuing more investments in fixed assets (which are harder to extract).
Moreover, we also find that politically connected firms have greater abilities to resist political extraction, and thus have more tendencies to accumulate cash reserves and spend less on investments than the non-connected firms.
The increasing contribution of the private sector to China's GDP cannot be ignored, despite the fact that they are competing at an uneven playing field to their state-owned counterparts. We show that the threat of political extraction (especially for private firms located in provinces with weaker institutions) may cause these firms to adopt corporate policies that will not represent the most optimum and efficient ones. In relationship-based transitional economies such as China, private firms will also need to invest in political capital to mitigate the threat of political extraction. Gradually, with the liberalization of international capital markets, it is even more compelling for Chinese regulators to instill reforms in financial and legal systems such that the problem of extraction is minimized. Fan and Wang (2001) . The index is constructed by the following information: (1) the provincial government's spending as a percentage of provincial GDP; (2) the tax rates in the province; (3) the time spent by entrepreneurs in dealing with the bureaucracy; and (4) the time needed for firm registration and to obtain various licenses, obtained from Fan and Wang (2001) .
Mkt1
The National Economics Research Institute (NERI) Index of Marketization from Fan and Wang (2001) . The index captures the following aspects of regional market development: (1) relationship between government and market; (2) development of non-sate business; (3) development of product markets; (4) development of factor markets; (5) development of market intermediaries and legal environment.
Mkt2
Market Index from Li et al. (2008) . The proportion of total fixed investment in a province that comes from private enterprises 
Firm-level financial variables
Cash
Cash holdings ratio, calculated as cash and cash equivalents divided by total assets.
Invest
Investment ratio, calculated as net capital expenditures divided by total sales. Q Tobin's Q, calculated as the market value of equity plus the book value of liability divided by book value of total assets.
Lev
Leverage ratio, calculated as total debt divided by total assets.
CF
Cash flow ratio, calculated as net cash flow from operating divided by total assets.
Capx
Capital expenditures ratio, calculated as capital expenditures divided by total assets.
Delta_NWC
Change in net working capital ratio, calculated as the change in net working capital divided by total assets.
Size
Size of the firm, calculated as the natural logarithm of total assets. Private is a dummy variable that is equal to 1 for entrepreneur-controlled firms; or 0 otherwise. Institution is one of the four provincial-level institutional indices: Decentr, Mkt1, Mkt2, and Legal. All firms-specific financial and control variables are as defined in the Appendix 1. The t-statistics are reported in parentheses. The estimated standard errors are corrected for heteroskedasticity and cross-correlations using the Huber-White estimator, clustered by firm. *, **, *** denotes statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels respectively. Private is a dummy variable that is equal to 1 for entrepreneur-controlled firms; or 0 otherwise. Institution is one of the four provincial-level institutional indices: Decentr, Mkt1, Mkt2, and Legal. All firms-specific financial and control variables are as defined in the Appendix 1. The t-statistics are reported in parentheses. The estimated standard errors are corrected for heteroskedasticity and cross-correlations using the Huber-White estimator, clustered by firm. *, **, *** denotes statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels respectively. Conn_Priv is a dummy variable, which equals 1 if the chairman or CEO of a private firm is politically connected with government; or 0 otherwise. Conn_SOE is a dummy variable, which equals 1 if the ultimate owner of a state-owned firm is a central (instead of local) government; or 0 otherwise. Institution is one of the four provincial-level institutional indices: Decentr, Mkt1, Mkt2, and Legal. All firms-specific financial and control variables are as defined in the Appendix 1. The t-statistics are reported in parentheses. The estimated standard errors are corrected for heteroskedasticity and cross-correlations using the Huber-White estimator, clustered by firm. *, **, *** denotes statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels respectively. 
